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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

HERCULES INCORPORATED,

]
i Appeal No. 93-0051

Petitioner,
vs.

i Priority No. 16

UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
AUDITING DIVISION,
Respondent.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-4 (1992) and Rule 49 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue 1.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals was correct

in finding several of the District Court's findings of fact
clearly erroneous.
Standard of Review:

Findings of fact will not be

set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.

See, Utah R. Civ.

P. 52(a) (as amended, effective January 1, 1987); See also,
Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467
(Utah 1989).
Issue 2. Whether the Utah Court of Appeals properly
determined that sales of rocket motors manufactured and delivered

in Utah to a Utah purchaser were Utah sales pursuant to Utah Code
Ann- § 59-7-318 (1987).
Standard of Review-

Conclusions of law will be

reviewed for correctness with no deference to the District
Court's interpretations.
(Utah 1990).

Ward v. Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757

See also State ex rel Div. of Consumer Protection

v. Rio Vista Oil, Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343 (Utah 1990); Berube v.
Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
Issue 3.

Whether the Tax Commission's including

Hercules' Utah sales of rocket motors to an in-state purchaser in
calculating Hercules' franchise tax liability violates the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.
Standard of Review.

Conclusions of law will be

reviewed for correctness with no deference to the District
Court' s interpretations.

Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
1.

U. S,. CONST., Art. I, § 8, CI. 3.

2.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-311 (1987).

3.

Utah Code Ann. S 59-7-317 (1987).

4.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987).

5.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-301 (1987).

6.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-102(3) (1987).

7.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1990).

8.

Utah Tax Commission Rule R865-6-8F(I)(4)(b) and
(C) 1(1989).
2

9.

Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

STATEMENT OF CASE
1.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This review on petition for certiorari is from a Utah
Court of Appeals decision ("Opinion") (Attached as Appendix 1)
overturning a decision rendered by the Third Judicial District
Court. (R. 418.) The District Court had reversed the decision of
the Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission" or "Commission")
and ruled that rocket motor sales made by Hercules to Lockheed
were not Utah sales and therefore not properly included in the
numerator of the Utah sales factor under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7317 (1987) and § 59-7-318 (1987) [renumbering § 59-13-92 and §
59-13-93].

(R. 432.) These sections of the Utah Code refer to

the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act ("UDITPA")
which sets forth the method for taxing income derived by a
corporation both from within and without the state of Utah.
Under the UDITPA, income is apportioned among taxing
states based on three factors: payroll/ property, and sales. The
sales factor is a fractionf "the numerator of which is the total
sales of the taxpayer within this state during the tax period,
and the denominator of which is the total sales of the taxpayer
everywhere during the tax period."
(1987).

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-317

The business income to be apportioned to Utah is

determined by "multiplying the income by a fraction, the
3

numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor
plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-311.
The issues in this case pertain only to the sales
factor of the formula.

The Tax Commission has determined that

the Utah portion of the sales factor (the numerator of the sales
ratio) should be increased to reflect Hercules Incorporated's
("Hercules") in-state sales of rocket motors to Lockheed Space
and Missile Company ("Lockheed").

Hercules' property and payroll

factors are not affected by the Commission's determination.
2.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

In 1982, the Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax
Commission ("Auditing Division") issued a Notice of Deficiency to
Hercules asserting that Hercules owed additional Utah corporate
franchise taxes for the years 1977 to 1980. (R. 720.)
On October 28, 1982, Hercules filed a Petition for
Redetermination with the Tax Commission. (R. 721.) On March 11,
1983, Hercules filed a Supplement to Petition for Redetermination
with the Tax Commission. (R. 728.)
On July 15, 1986, the Tax Commission held an informal
hearing on Hercules' Petition for Redetermination and on November
12, 1986 the Tax Commission issued its Informal Decision
affirming the deficiency assessed by the Auditing Division.
696, 701.)

4

(R.

On August 24, 1987, a formal hearing was held before
the Tax Commission. (R. 1058.)

The Tax Commission issued its

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Decision on
October 4, 1988. (R. 622.)

In its decision, the Tax Commission

affirmed the audit deficiency in favor of the Auditing Division.
(R. 29, 629.)
On November 2, 1988, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-1505 (1987), Hercules paid $890,462.00, which amount included tax
and interest, to the Tax Commission as a prerequisite to taking
its appeal to the District Court.

Of that amount, $456,512.00

was contested and paid under protest. (R. 13.)
On January 31, 1989, Hercules filed with the District
Court an Amended Appeal, Petition for Review and Complaint
seeking review of the Tax Commission's ruling. (R. 63.) After
oral argument, the District Court issued a Memorandum Decision,
dated February 1, 1991, and final Judgment, dated March 11, 1991,
reversing the Tax Commission's ruling and ordering the Commission
to refund, with interest, the taxes that Hercules paid under
protest. (R. 418, 438.)

The District Court held that Hercules'

sales to Lockheed were not Utah sales pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-7-317 and § 59-7-318. (R. 432.)

The District Court further

held that the Auditing Division's taxation of Hercules
constituted double taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause
of the United States. (R. 432.)

5

The Commission timely appealed the District Court
decision to this Court which transferred the case to the Court of
Appeals-

On December 31, 1992, the Court of Appeals' Opinion

reversed the District Court in favor of the Auditing Division.
On January 28, 1993, Hercules petitioned this Court for Writ of
Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals.

On June 18, 1993, this

Court granted Hercules' Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
During the years 1977 to 1980, Hercules was obligated
under a subcontract with Lockheed to manufacture rocket motors
for the Trident C-4 missile.

Lockheed was obligated under a

prime contract with the U.S. Government to manufacture the
Trident C-4 missile.

In 1982, the Auditing Division issued a

"Notice of Deficiency" to Hercules for additional Utah corporate
franchise tax for calendar years 1977 through 1980. The
deficiency was based on the Auditing Division's interpretation
and application of Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-7-317 and 59-7-318 (1987)
to rocket motors manufactured by Hercules at its Bacchus, Utah
facility. (R. 720.)
The entire manufacturing process which produced the
rocket motors took place at Hercules' facility in Bacchus, Utah.
(R. 1119-23, 1146-47.)

Lockheed was the prime contractor which

was to provide completed missiles to the U.S. Government.
Hercules was a subcontractor, which was to provide motor
components to Lockheed.
6

When the manufacturing of the rocket motors was
completed under the subcontract, Lockheed inspected the motors
and received title to the motors at Bacchus, Utah,

(R. 661.)

The U.S. Government in turn took title to the motors in Utah
before shipping the motors to the out of state facilities.

The

rocket motors were then shipped via common carrier, under a U.S.
Government bill of lading, to a military seaport assembly
facility.

(R. 662.)

The point of final acceptance by Lockheed

and the United States was at Hercules' Bacchus, Utah facility.
(R. 661.)
Upon final acceptance and title transfer, the motors
met all contract specifications required at that point.
662.)

(R.

The subcontract items consisted of the unconnected first,

second and third stage motors of the C-4 missile body, each
containing an explosive propellant, in an inert form, to
facilitate interstate transportation to a seaport assembly
facility.

(R. 675, 1145.)
The Trident missile, the subject of the prime contract,

was comprised of the motors and many other necessary component
parts, some of which were supplied by Hercules and some of which
were supplied by Lockheed, the United States, or third parties.
(R. 659, 1088.)

The missile assembly process was completed by

the prime contractor, Lockheed, at the destination assembly
facility.

(R. 1120.)

At the destination facility, Lockheed

performed the hands-on manufacturing work, and Hercules provided
7

only advisory and technical assistance and inspection oversight
to assure that specifications were met.

(R. 1123, 1146, 1158.)

The final step in the manufacturing and assembly
process was performed by Lockheed at the seaport facilities.
1146.)

(R.

At that point, the United States took possession of the

assembled missile, attached the nuclear warhead or other cargo
and placed the same in a canister for storage or loading into
Navy submarines at the assembly site.

(R. 1088, 1158.)

Hercules was compensated by a cost-plus, fixed fee
contract calling for partial payment upon delivery in Utah as
well as additional payments for services performed at the
destination facilities and future component performance.

The

contract provided for incentives to reward good performance as
well as penalties to deter bad performance.

The compensation

which Hercules received was based upon costs incurred together
with a portion of the profits based upon acceptance at the plant,
with some of the future profits withheld contingent upon
component performance.

(R. 659.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Court of Appeals was correct in finding several of
the District Court's findings of fact clearly erroneous and
totally without support in the record.

In finding several of

these findings clearly erroneous, the Court of Appeals correctly
applied Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 and found that Hercules'
delivery of rocket motors to Lockheed at Bacchus, Utah

8

constituted Utah sales and were appropriately included in the
Utah sales factor under the UDITPA.
The Court of Appeals' analysis and non-application of
the destination rule was proper in this case. While the Tax
Commission has accepted the validity of the destination rule, it
is not applicable to the facts of this case. Whether the
destination rule is a valid rule of law has never been contested
by the Tax Commission.

Neither the Tax Commission nor the Court

of Appeals applied the destination rule in this case because the
facts and clear language of § 59-7-318 simply do not warrant it.
The Court of Appeals properly found that no interstate
sale occurred and therefore, no double taxation issue in
violation of the Commerce Clause is raised.

Regardless of

whether an interstate sale occurred, Utah's inclusion of a sale
which occurred in Utah in the numerator of the sales factor does
not violate the principles of the UDITPA or Commerce Clause of
the United States Constitution.
Under the controlling case of Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), a taxing authority must
satisfy four prongs in order to sustain a tax on interstate
commerce.

The four prongs are as follows:
(1)

The tax must be applied to an activity with a

substantial nexus with the taxing state;
(2)

The tax must be fairly apportioned;

9

(3)

The tax must not discriminate against interstate

commerce; and
(4)

The tax must be fairly related to the services

provided by the state.
Id. at 279.
Because the Tax Commission has satisfied these four
prongs in taxing Hercules' sales to Lockheed in Utah, the tax is
not violative of the Commerce Clause and should be upheld.

The

facts of this case show that the rocket motors sold by Hercules
to Lockheed constitute Utah sales, not California or Washington
sales.
There is no evidence in the record as to exactly what
transpired between Hercules and the California and Washington
taxing authorities.

The fact that Hercules paid tax in some

other jurisdiction is irrelevant regardless of whether it was
paid mistakenly, voluntarily, or involuntarily.
bound by the decisions of other states.

Utah cannot be

The sales at issue in

this case were clearly Utah sales and are therefore properly
included in the numerator of the Utah sales factor under the
UDITPA.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FACTS SHOW, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY FOUND, THAT THE SALES OF THE
MISSILE MOTORS WERE UTAH SALES.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987) dictates when a sale
occurs in Utah for franchise tax purposes:
10

(1) Sales of tangible personal property are
in this state if:
(a) the property is delivered or
shipped to a purchaser, other than
the United States Government,
within this state, regardless of
the f.o.b. point or other
conditions of the sale.
The Utah Administrative Code further defines the
meaning of the language in Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987),
"delivered or shipped to a purchaser . . . within this state."
(b) Property shall be deemed to be delivered
or shipped to a purchaser within this state
if the recipient is located in this state
even though the property is ordered from
outside the state.
(c) Property is delivered or shipped to a
purchaser within this state if the shipment
terminates in this state, even though the
property is subsequently transferred by the
purchaser to another state.
Utah Code Admin. P. R865-6-8F(I)(4)(b), (c) (emphasis added).
The facts were stipulated that Lockheed was located within the
State of Utah an had a business presence here at the time it
purchased the rocket motors from Hercules.

And, while the rocket

motors were eventually shipped out of Utah by the U.S.
Government, they were nevertheless delivered to Lockheed, a Utah
purchaser, in Bacchus, Utah.

Therefore, under the clear language

of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 and Utah Code Admin. P. R865-6-8F,
the sales were Utah sales under the UDITPA.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-106(l) (1990) states that "[a]
'sale' consists of the passing of title from the seller to the
11

buyer for a price . . . ."

The parties have stipulated that

title to the rocket motors passes in Bacchus, Utah,

(R. 19.)

The contract between Hercules and Lockheed states that
"acceptance shall constitute delivery for satisfying the delivery
schedules set forth herein and provide substantiation for billing
purposes, and acknowledges that title to the subcontractor end
items vests in LMSC [Lockheed Missiles and Space Company]." (R.
661.)

Clearly, if Lockheed is being billed by Hercules under the

contract for the motors, Lockheed is paying a price for the
rocket motors.

Therefore, both requirements of § 70A-2-106(l)

constituting a sale are met by the transaction between Hercules
and Lockheed in Bacchus, Utah.
The Court of Appeals found that "[t]he [District]
[C]ourt erred when it found the subject matter of the Hercules
sale to Lockheed was a functional or usable motor that could be
fired."

Opinion at 4.

The Court of Appeals found further that

"[t]he manufacturing of the missile motor was complete at
Hercules' Bacchus facility."

Opinion at 4.

These findings are

fully supported by the record and the District Court's findings
to the contrary are clearly erroneous and without support in the
record.
Hercules argues that "when the motors left Utah, they
were inert, dysfunctional and lacked critical interface and
ignition components" and therefore the manufacture of the missile
motors was not complete when Lockheed accepted delivery at
12

Hercules' Bacchus facility.

Brief of Petitioner at 37-40. That

argument is illogical and without merit given the simple facts of
this case.

The contract between Hercules and Lockheed calls for

the sale of rocket motors - not the sale of completed missiles.
It is irrelevant that the motors are "inert" and are inoperable
until integrated into the missile.
The point is that Hercules was only responsible for the
motor under the subcontract.

The propulsion systems for Lockheed

contracted which were complete when they were accepted by
Lockheed in Bacchusf Utah.

However, the systems would not fire

until after Lockheed installed the additional initiation/
ignition, and activation devices at Lockheed's seaport facility.
(R. 1123, lines 3-12; R. 1146, lines 9-11.) Hercules was
responsible only for the motors.

The record is clear that the

additional material needed to convert the completed motors into a
total missile was installed entirely by Lockheed employees at its
seaport facility.

(R. 1119, line 23 - R. 1120, line 4.; R. 1146,

lines 9-14.) Therefore, when Hercules delivers the completed
motors and title to those motors is transferred to Lockheed at
the Bacchus, Utah facility, a Utah delivery and sale occur for
taxation purposes.
The Court of Appeals properly concluded that "[t]he
tangible personal property contracted for by Hercules and
Lockheed, and the subject matter of the sale generating the
business income to be apportioned, was the missile motor as it
13

left Hercules' Bacchus facility.*'

Opinion at 4-5.

The Court of

Appeals continued by concluding that "[a]pplying section 59-13-93
[renumbered in 1987 as § 59-7-318] to the motor as it left
Hercules' Bacchus facility leads to only one reasonable
conclusion:

the sale of the missile motor was a Utah sale,"

Opinion at 5.

The facts surrounding the sale of the rocket

motors by Hercules to Lockheed at Bacchus, Utah fit squarely
within the definitions of sale explicitly defined in Utah Code
Ann. §§ 59-7-318 (1987) and 70A-2-106(l) (1990).

As Utah sales,

the sales of the rocket motors by Hercules are properly included
in the Utah sales factor under the UDITPA.
A.

Hercules' arguing in favor of
application of the destination rule in
this case is misleading.

Hercules claims that the Court of Appeals' analysis of
the cases Hercules cites in support of application of the
destination rule is "superficial and demonstrably incorrect."
Brief of Petitioner at 21.

In support of its erroneous claim,

Hercules notes that "[n]one of the cited cases suggests the beer,
carpet, banana and petroleum companies could not also have had
presence in the origin or manufacturing state as well as the
destination state."

Brief of Petitioner at 21. Again, this

argument is irrelevant and only serves to confuse the pivotal
issue of this case; that is, "where did the sale of the rocket
motors occur?"

14

First, as discussed above, the facts surrounding the
sale of the rocket motors to Lockheed in Bacchus, Utah fall
clearly within Utah's UDITPA statute and commercial code.

The

plain language of § 59-7-318 mandates the inclusion of Hercules'
rocket motor sales which take place in Utah in the sales factor.
That is precisely why neither the Tax Commission nor the Court of
Appeals found the destination rule applicable in this case.
Second, the cases cited by Hercules which apply the
destination rule are factually distinguishable from this case.
Hercules attempts to revive its destination rule argument in the
face of the Court of Appeals' flat refusal to apply it by arguing
what "could have been" or "might have been" the facts of the
cases Hercules cites.

"The beer, carpet, banana and petroleum

companies in the cases Hercules cited either had or could have
had 'presence' in the state seeking to impose the tax just as
Lockheed had 'presence in Utah.'"

Brief of Petitioner at 24.

However, each of the courts rendering the opinions on which
Hercules relies make clear that the purchasers in those cases did
not have presence in the taxing state.

Hercules' speculation to

the contrary is misleading and should be given absolutely no
weight by this Court.
In Olvmpia Brewing Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 326
N.W.2d 642 (Minn. 1982) the Minnesota Supreme Court clearly
adopts the destination rule.

However, the facts of the case, as

stated by the Minnesota Court were that only out-of-state
15

purchasers were involved.

"In computing the sales-within-

Minnesota factor, Olympia excluded all beer sold by its St. Paul
brewery to out-of-state wholesale distributors and included all
beer sold . . . to Minnesota wholesale distributors."
Brewing Co.. 326 N.W.2d at 644 (emphasis added).

Olympia

The facts are

clear that the only issue involved whether or not to include the
sales made to out-of-state distributors because the beer sold to
Minnesota distributors had already been included by the taxpayer
in computing its sales factor.

The Minnesota Supreme Court

continued and stated that "Olympia is not suggesting that the
location of the final consumer, after resale upon resale, be
determinative of the sales classification.

The inquiry ends when

it is determined where the initial purchaser is located; it is
there that shipment and delivery terminate."

Ld. at 647

(emphasis added).
In this case, the parties stipulated that Lockheed was
a purchaser located in Utah.

(R. 19.)

Under the reasoning of

Olympia Brewing, the inquiry ends there because Lockheed was the
initial purchaser of the rocket motors from Hercules.

One need

not apply the destination rule once it is determined that the
purchaser (Lockheed) is located in Utah.

The stipulation that

Lockheed is an in-state purchaser should end the inquiry.

The

destination rule need not be applied because no out-of-state
purchaser is involved in the Utah sale.

16

Likewise, in Strickland v. Patcraft Mills, Inc., 302
S.E.2d 544 (Ga. 1983), applying the destination rule, the Georgia
Supreme Court stated that "[i]n all the transactions under
review, Patcraft, a Georgia corporation, allowed out-of-state
customers to pick up merchandise at its Dalton headquarters for
transport and resale out of state."

Strickland, 302 S.E.2d at

544 (emphasis added).
In Pabst Brewing Co. v. Wisconsin Department of
Revenue, 387 N.W.2d 121 (Wis.Ct.App. 1986), the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals also recognized the destination rule.

However, it too

concluded that the "purchaser's business location controls."
Pabst Brewing, 387 N.W.2d at 123.

"We conclude that because the

location of the purchasing wholesaler rather than the pick up
controls whether the sales are in this state . . . .

.Id. at 123.

The Pabst Brewing Court explicitly states in the fact section of
its opinion that "[t]he issue is whether Pabst's sales of beer to
out-of-state wholesalers who pick up the beer at its Milwaukee
plant for out-of-state distribution are sales 'in this state'
under [the UDITPA]."
added).

Pabst Brewing, 387 N.W.2d at 122 (emphasis

The facts in Pabst Brewing make clear that the Wisconsin

Court was only considering tax on sales made to out-of-state
purchasers.

If these purchasers "had" or "could have had"

presence in Wisconsin, it would be unusual that the court would
explicitly state that they were out-of-state purchasers.
Hercules' argument misstates the facts of the cases.
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In Texaco v. Groppo, 574 A.2d 1293 (Conn. 1990), the
Connecticut Supreme Court also noted that "the plaintiff supplied
petroleum products to five distributors whose businesses and
customers were located entirely outside the state."
A.2d at 1294 (emphasis added).

Texaco, 574

If the distributors' businesses

and customers were located entirely outside the state, it seems
irrational to assume that they "had" or "could have had" presence
within Connecticut.

Hercules' arguing that they "could have"

ignores the clear language of the decision.
In Department of Revenue v. Parker Banana Co., 391
So.2d 762 (Fla.Ct.App. 1980), the Florida Court of Appeals also
clearly adopts the destination rule.

However, the Florida Court

of Appeals stated that the issue in the case arose because "[i]n
computing its Florida corporate income tax, Parker Banana treated
all sales to purchasers from outside Florida as sales not in the
state."

Parker Banana, 391 So.2d at 762 (emphasis added).

The

Florida Department of Revenue "took the position that only those
sales to out-of-state purchasers who used common carriers to pick
up their bananas could properly be characterized as sales not in
this state for purposes of the apportionment formula."
Banana, 391 So.2d at 763.

Parker

The facts of Parker Banana as stated

by the Florida Court of Appeals reveal that the only transactions
at issue were those involving out-of-state purchasers.
Therefore, contrary to Hercules' assertions, none of the
purchasers had presence within the state.
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In Howmet Corporation v. Revenue Division of the
Michigan Dept. of Treasury, 1993 WL 45075 (Mich.Ct.CI. 1993), the
Michigan Court of Claims addressed the issue of whether a
privilege tax levied on out-of-state sales against an in-state
manufacturer violated the UDITPA or the Commerce Clause.

The

Michigan court concluded that the in-state manufacturer had
sufficient nexus with the destination states to allow imposition
of privilege tax by those destination states.

Again, the facts

of the instant case as found by the Court of Appeals are
distinguishable.

The sale of the rocket motors occurred in Utah,

not in Washington or California.

In Howmet, it is undisputed

that the sales occurred in the destination states.

Furthermore,

the relevant statutory standard in Michigan is different than
Utah's.

In Michigan, the UDITPA statute states that "sales of

tangible personal property to purchasers in other states are to
be treated as 'in this state' where . . . [t]he property is
shipped from a • . . place of storage in this state and the
purchaser is the United States government, or the taxpayer is not
taxable in the state of the purchaser."
*2.

Howmet, 1993 WL 45075 at

Therefore, the Michigan court's inquiry focused on whether

the taxpayer was properly "taxable in the statefs] of the
purchaserfs]."

The Michigan court found that the taxpayer was

properly taxable in the states of the purchasers.

However, it

did not reach this conclusion through application of the
destination rule as Hercules leads this Court to believe.
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The

Michigan court reached its conclusion by applying standards
outlined by the U.S. Supreme Court to determine the nexus between
the "destination states" and the taxpayer.

It is significant to

note that the Michigan court applied the four-pronged Complete
Auto test to the Michigan tax to determine its constitutionality
as discussed in section II of this brief.
The manufacture of the missile motors was completed and
delivered to an in-state purchaser (Lockheed) in Utah, not in
Washington or California.

Other than Hercules occasionally

"signing off" at certain points at the port facilities, the only
transactions which took place in Washington and California were
between Lockheed and the U.S. Government.
1123, 1146-47.)

(R. 1092-94, 1119-20,

Therefore, the Court of Appeals properly found

that the sale of the rocket motors was a Utah sale under the
UDITPA. None of Hercules' "authorities" supports application of
the destination rule in this case because in all those cases, the
facts are clear that none of the purchasers were in-state
purchasers.

All were out-of-state purchasers which came into the

taxing state to take delivery from an in-state seller.
Hercules attempts to distinguish Bullock v. Ensearch
Exploration, Inc., 614 S.W.2d 215 (Tex.Civ.App. 1981), by
pointing out that the sales in Bullock involved natural gas which
was commingled in a single tank prior to shipment out of state.
"The gas seller could not foresee the ultimate destination of the
fungible goods injected into a pipeline."
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Brief of Petitioner at

27, n. 4.

This is an interesting distinction because in Texaco,

which Hercules cites in support of its argument, title to
petroleum products passed in Connecticut which were taken from
Texaco's terminals by out-of-state purchasers.

Texaco would

likewise be unable to foresee the "ultimate destination" of the
petroleum.
Nevertheless, the Bullock Court stated that "[i]t makes
no difference that the gas eventually moves in interstate
commerce.

For the purposes of [the UDITPA], its status is simply

determined by whether such property, when sold, is delivered or
shipped to a purchaser within Texas."
217.

Bullock, 614 S.W.2d at

The Texas Court of Appeals noted that "[i]t is [the taxing

authority's] position that, in spite of the fact that this
natural gas is eventually delivered by third parties to
destinations outside of Texas, the sale of the natural gas is
completed within the state and is therefore taxable.
with this conclusion."

We agree

Bullock, 614 S.W.2d at 217. The Bullock

Court continued by noting that "[t]he statute in question is
clear and unambiguous and means exactly what it says when it is
applied to the facts of this case."

Id.

Distinction of the Bullock case attempted by Hercules
is meaningless.

As cases cited by Hercules make clear, the

inquiry ends when it is determined that the property is delivered
to the in-state initial purchaser.

The Court of Appeals found

that the completed rocket motors were delivered to Lockheed (an
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in-state purchaser) and were therefore Utah sales-

The Court of

Appeals did exactly what the UDITPA requires and therefore its
decision was proper given the clear statutory language of § 59-7318.
Hercules' reliance on the authority it cites to support
its assertion that the Tax Commission has not accepted the
destination rule is untenable.

Whether or not the destination

rule (however defined) is an accepted rule of law has never been
argued or contested by the Tax Commission.

Both the Court of

Appeals and the Tax Commission found that this case is
distinguished factually, not legally, from the cases cited by
Hercules in support of its futile "destination rule" argument.
(R. 627, Opinion at 5.)

The distinguishing and controlling fact

is that the completed rocket motors were sold by Hercules to
Lockheed in Utah.

Therefore, Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 controls

regardless of the existence of the destination rule and requires
that the rocket motor sales be apportioned to Utah, not
Washington or California. (See chart attached as Appendix 2.)
II.

THE TAX COMMISSION'S INCLUDING A UTAH
SALE IN THE SALES FACTOR NUMERATOR DOES
NOT VIOLATE THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION.

As discussed above, the Court of Appeals properly found
that no interstate sale occurred and therefore, no Commerce
Clause double taxation issue is raised.

However, even if the

sale of the rocket motors can somehow be imputed to Washington or
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California, Utah's inclusion of the rocket motor sales in the
numerator of the sales factor is constitutional under the tests
set forth by the United States Supreme Court.
A.

Burden of proof.

A taxpayer must satisfy a substantial burden of proof
in order to prevail in a Commerce Ciauso challenge.

The United

States Supreme Ccurt stated that it will only strike the tax if:
[T]he taxpayer can prove by clear and cogent
evidence that the income attributed to the
State is in fact out of all appropriate
proportions to the business transacted . . .
in that State or has led to a grossly
distorted result.
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,
170 (1983) .
The Court continued:
Appellant has the burden of proof; it must
demonstrate that there is no rational
relationship between the income attributed to
the State and the intrastate values of the
enterprise, by proving that the income
apportioned to California under the statute
is out of all proportion to the business
transacted by the appellant in that state.
Id. at 180-181 (citations omitted).
satisfy its burden.

Hercules has failed to

The sale of rocket motors, as determined by

the contract between Hercules and Lockheed, and found by the Tax
Commission and the Court of Appeals, occurred in Bacchus, Utah.
The income from the sale must be attributed to the sales factor
in Utah and, therefore, must be allocated to and taxed by the
State of Utah.

Hercules introduced no evidence that refutes the
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sale in Bacchus, Utah.

Essentially, Hercules only argues that

because it may have paid tax in some other jurisdictionf it need
not pay tax on sales it makes within Utah which are properly
includable under the UDITPA.
The Tax Commission is concerned with the rocket motor
sales simply for purposes of calculating the Utah sales factor.
Because the rocket motor sales occurred in Utah, the Auditing
Division properly imputed those sales as Utah sales for franchise
tax purposes.

Accordingly, Hercules has failed to prove that the

business transacted between Hercules and Lockheed did not have a
substantial relationship to the state of Utah for apportionment
purposes.
B.

The test for unconstitutional double
taxation.

Hercules asserts that "'Double Taxation' in this case
is a stipulated fact, not an unproven hypothetical."
Petitioner at 28.

Brief of

Hercules claims that the mere fact that it

paid some form of tax in California and Washington means Utah
cannot constitutionally apply unambiguous Utah law to Hercules'
in-state sales.

However, the fact that a taxpayer pays tax in

two jurisdictions (even if done "involuntarily") does not
automatically make the tax unconstitutional.
The test for determining whether a state tax
apportionment method survives constitutional scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause is outlined in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
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Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

Complete Auto sets forth a four

pronged test that must be satisfied to sustain an apportioned tax
on interstate commerce.

The four tests are:

(1) The tax must be applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus with the taxing
state;
(2)

The tax must be fairly apportioned;

(3) The tax must not discriminate against
interstate commerce; and
(4) The tax must be fairly related to the
services provided by the state
Id. at 279.
1.

Substantial Nexus With Taxing State

The first prong of Complete Auto is plainly satisfied
in this case.

Hercules is a Utah taxpayer doing business in Salt

Lake County, Utah.

The contract between Hercules and Lockheed

was for the sale and delivery of rocket motors at Hercules' place
of business in Bacchus, Utah.

The rocket motors were

manufactured in Utah prior to their sale.

Finally, plant

inspection, acceptance and passage of title to Lockheed all
occurred in Utah.

Each of the facts provides more than

sufficient nexus with the state of Utah for imposition of
apportioned franchise tax.
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2.

Internal and External Consistency

The second requirement set out by Complete Auto is that
the tax must be fairly apportioned.

This requires the tax to be

both internally and externally consistent.
U.S. 159 at 169.

Container Corp., 463

Utah's taxing method (Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-317

and § 59-7-318) satisfies both these requirements.
a)

Internal Consistency

To be internally consistent, "a tax must be structured
so that if every state were to impose an identical tax, no
multiple taxation would result," Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252,
261 (1987).

The intention of the UDITPA statute is to assure

that no multiple taxation results.

In fact, the purpose of the

UDITPA is to organize a strict design whereby each state is only
entitled to a calculated portion of a corporation's sales.
Accordingly, the inherent result of employing the statute is
avoidance of multiple taxation.
The fact that Hercules paid tax in other jurisdictions
does not amount to multiple taxation.

In Moorman Manufacturing

Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978), an Illinois corporation
contested Iowa's use of a single factor franchise tax formula to
apportion an interstate business' income.

The taxpayer in

Moorman argued that both Iowa and Illinois taxed a portion of its
income derived from business transactions which took place in
Iowa.

Thus, the taxpayer claimed that double taxation resulted
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because Iowa used a single factor formula while Illinois used the
more widely accepted three-factor formula. Jd.. at 276.
The Court stated:
The simple answer, however, is that whatever
disparity may have existed is not
attributable to the Iowa statute. It treats
both local and foreign concerns with an even
hand; the alleged disparity can only be the
consequence of the combined effect of the
Iowa and Illinois statutes, and Iowa is not
responsible for the latter.
Thus, appellant's "discrimination" claim is
simply a way of describing the potential
consequences of the use of different formulas
by the two States. These consequences,
however, could be avoided by the adoption of
any uniform rule; the "discrimination" does
not inhere in either State's formula.
Id. at 277, n. 12.
Similarly, in the instant case, the overlap in taxation
cannot be ascribed to Utah.

As previously mentioned, Utah

adheres to a uniform rule that carves out only that portion of
tax that the State is entitled to.

If the states involved were

to properly apply the UDITPA, it is plain that Utah is
statutorily entitled to include the Utah sale of rocket motors
between Hercules and Lockheed, a Utah purchaser, in the numerator
of the sales factor.

Despite the fact that Hercules paid some

form of franchise tax to alternate taxing authorities (Washington
and California), it is critical to note that the state of Utah
was the authority justified in including the rocket motor sales
made within the state.

Under the facts of this case, Hercules'
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argument is with California and Washington, not Utah.

While

Hercules may have paid some tax in two separate taxing states,
such does not represent double taxation in violation of the
Commerce Clause, but only an error of Hercules in failing to
recognize its statutory obligation for sales made within the
state of Utah.
Hercules argues that "[t]he Tax Commission's reliance
upon Moorman is misplaced because the facts there were strikingly
dissimilar to the facts here."
is untrue.

Brief of Petitioner at 31. This

In Moorman, the taxpayer was challenging the Iowa

statute by claiming that both Iowa and Illinois were imposing tax
on income derived from Iowa sales.

Hercules likewise challenges

Utah's assessment by alleging that payment of Utah, California,
and Washington taxes would result in double taxation.

In

Moorman, the taxpayer had failed to prove which portion of its
income had been earned from the Iowa sales, leaving the Court
unable to determine "whether the Illinois and Iowa together
imposed tax on more than 100% of the relevant income."
437 U.S. at 276.

Moorman,

The record in this case likewise "does not

establish the essential factual predicate for a claim of
duplicative taxes" (Id.) since there is not one scintilla of
evidence showing the amount of tax Hercules paid in either
Washington or California nor is there any evidence of the amount
of income Hercules earned in Washington and California.
Therefore, as in Moorman, Hercules' claim of duplicative taxation
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is merely speculative and therefore the Commission's inclusion of
the rocket motor sales in the numerator of the sales factor
should be upheld.
b)

External Consistency

To satisfy the external consistency test, the state
must tax only that portion of the revenues from the interstate
activity that reasonably reflect the instate component of the
activity being taxed.

Goldberg, 488 U.S. at 262 (1987).

The

rocket motors at issue are manufactured, delivered, and sold,
including transfer of title, all within the state of Utah.
Accordingly, in the present action, the Auditing Division is only
seeking to include the initial sale of rocket motors as per
contract between Hercules and Lockheed in Bacchus, Utah.
Therefore, contrary to Hercules' assertion that Utah and the
other states are "taxing Hercules like predators fighting over a
kill" (Brief of Petitioner at 31), Utah is only adhering to the
clear statutory mandate of the UDITPA.

Incidentally, the states

of Washington and California are also entitled to revenue
generated from the payroll and property factors of the UDITPA
formula which reflect Hercules activities in those states.
However, because the sales of the rocket motors did not occur
within those states, Utah, not California or Washington, is
statutorily entitled to include the sales in the sales factor
numerator franchise tax purposes.
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3.

No Discrimination Against Interstate
Commerce

The third prong of Complete Auto provides that the tax
must not discriminate against interstate commerce.

This

requirement attempts to avoid taxing companies engaged in
interstate transactions more than firms engaged in in-state
transactions.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-317 and § 59-7-318 is

intentionally designed to assure that Utah does not discriminate
against interstate commerce.

The purpose of the UDITPA is to

organize a model statute whereby each state is only entitled to
apportion a calculated share of an corporation's interstate
sales.

Hence, the ultimate result of the statute's application

is a uniform taxation method and avoidance of impermissible
discrimination.
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-102(3) (1987) imposes a
five percent franchise tax on corporations conducting business
within the state of Utah.

This statute explicitly precludes any

discriminatory effect by taxing all businesses at the same rate
regardless of whether it is an interstate or intrastate
corporation.

Once the Tax Commission has determined that an

interstate corporation's sale is "within the state" for taxing
purposes pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318, that
corporation's sale is properly included in the numerator of the
sales factor and taxed at the same rate as any other corporation
established within the state of Utah.
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4.

Fairly Related to Services Provided by
the Taxing State

Finally, Complete Auto requires that the tax be fairly
related to the services provided by the state.

"The fourth prong

of the Complete Auto test thus focuses on the wide range of
benefits provided to the taxpayer, not just the precise activity
connected to the interstate activity at issue." Goldberg v.
Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 267 (1989).

The crux of this requirement is

that multistate corporations must pay their fair share of the
benefits provided them by the state in which they are located.
Hercules, as a significant business in the state of Utah, calls
upon the state of Utah for countless services.

To mention a few,

Hercules is provided with fire and police services at their
facilities.

The state of Utah builds roads allowing access to

and from Hercules facilities and operations.

Utah also affords

Hercules judicial forums to redress any grievances. While this
list of services is not exhaustive, the point is that the
services cannot be provided without fairly apportioning to
multistate entities their share of the costs.

By imposing the

franchise tax upon Hercules, Utah is able to effectively provide
a myriad of services to Hercules. As the Court said in Complete
Auto "[i]t was not the purpose of the commerce clause to relieve
those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of
state tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing
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business."

430 U.S. at 279 (quoting Western Live Stock v. Bureau

of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 254 (1938)).
Hercules stresses the fact that "California and
Washington are sovereign states with powers to enforce their tax
law against taxpayers who may not view taxation to states other
than Utah as 'voluntary,' as does the Utah State Tax Commission."
Brief of Petitioner at 32. However, like California and
Washington, Utah also has the power to enforce its tax law
against taxpayers who do business and generate income from sales
made to in-state purchasers.

The important point is that Utah

cannot be bound by the actions of other taxing jurisdictions.
The Tax Commission must execute and administer the tax laws of
the State of Utah, not those of California or Washington.

This

Court would be establishing dangerous precedent if it allowed
other state's actions or the timing of those actions to determine
the legality or constitutionality of the Tax Commission's
administration of Utah's tax code.
CONCLUSION
The Utah Court of Appeals was proper in finding several
of the District Court's factual findings clearly erroneous.

The

Court of Appeals properly found that the sales of the completed
rocket motors which were the subject of the contract between
Hercules and Lockheed were complete when Lockheed took delivery
of the motors at Hercules' Bacchus facility.
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Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 (1987) provides that a sale
is within this state if "the property is delivered or shipped to
a purchaser . . . within the state."

In the instant action, the

rocket motors, per the contract between Hercules and Lockheed,
were delivered to Lockheed at Hercules' place of business in
Bacchus, Utah.

Moreover, Lockheed is a Utah purchaser.

is a Utah taxpayer.

Lockheed

It has property, payroll, and sales in the

state of Utah and accordingly files Utah corporate tax returns.
Because the sale of rocket motors between Hercules and Lockheed
occurred in Utah between a Utah seller and a Utah purchaser, the
Court of Appeals was correct in finding that a Utah sale occurred
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 and is properly includable under
the UDITPA.
The Court of Appeals was proper in holding that the
Auditing Division's tax assessment did not constitute double
taxation in violation of the Commerce Clause because no
interstate sale occurred.

Under the UDITPA statute, Utah was the

proper taxing jurisdiction.

The actions of Washington and

California should not be allowed to determine the obligation of
the Tax Commission to administer the tax laws of the State of
Utah.

The clear mandate of Utah Code Ann. § 59-7-318 requires

that Utah sales be included in the numerator of the sales factor
and the fact that Hercules paid some form of franchise tax to
another jurisdiction does not make Utah guilty of double
taxation.

Further, Utah's UDITPA tax satisfies each of the four
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tests set out in Complete Auto Transit Inc. v. Brady and should
therefore be upheld.
For these reasons, this court should affirm the Court
of Appeal's r u l i n g .
DATED this

n<JJ

BRIAN L. TARBET
Assistant Attorney General
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JACKSON, Judge:
Appellant (Tax Commission) appeals a decision of the Third
Judicial District Court Tax Division entitling appellee
(Hercules) to recover the tax in controversy plus interest. We
reverse.
FACTS
During the years 1977 through 1980, the United States
Government had a contract with Lockheed Missiles & Space Company
(Lockheed) to build Trident missiles. Lockheed subcontracted
with Hercules to build the missile motors.1 Hercules
1. Much confusion exists over the definition of "missile motor."
Thus, it is important at the outset to distinguish between the
missile motor, the missile propulsion subsystem, and the
(continued...)

manufactured the motors at its Bacchus, Utah facility. Upon
completion of the manufacturing process, Lockheed, who had a
business presence in Utah, inspected the motors and received
title to them at the Bacchus facility. At this point, the
subcontract items consisted of the unconnected first, second, and
third stage motors of the missile—three canisters containing an
explosive propellant in an inert form. The units were then
shipped from Utah via common carrier, on a government bill of
lading, to a military assembly facility at a seaport in one of
several destination states. It was Lockheed's contractual
obligation at each of these facilities to assemble the components
of the missile. Hercules, under its subcontract, provided many
support services at these facilities. Hercules was compensated
by a cost-plan, fixed fee contract calling for partial payment
upon delivery to Lockheed at Bacchus, as well as additional
payment for services performed at the destination facilities.
Payment was also based on component performance.2 The contract
provided for incentives rewarding good performance and penalties
discouraging bad performance.3
In 1982, the Auditing Division of the Tax Commission issued
a "Notice of Deficiency" to Hercules claiming additional Utah
Corporate Franchise taxes were due for the years 1977 through
1980. On October 4, 1988, the Tax Commission, after a formal
hearing, affirmed the audit deficiency. On November 2, 1988,
1. (...continued)
completed missile. The record and the subcontract show that the
motor is essentially three large canisters filled with "tooled"
explosives. The motor is a component of the propulsion
subsystem. In addition to the motor, the propulsion subsystem
consists of firing units, actuators, adaptor sections, and
various other components. The propulsion subsystem, together
with the re-entry bodies, the nose fairing and the nose cap, make
up the completed missile.
2. A missile motor is not like a car motor. The missile motor
is capable of being fired one time only. Once the motor is
ignited the "tooled" explosives burn at a steady pace until they
burn out. The missile cannot be test-fired to check performance.
Consequently, performance-based payments are not received until
the missile is actually deployed.
3. Lockheed had supervisors at the Hercules facility and
Hercules had supervisors at the destination facility. Each had
to "sign off" on the work completed by the other. This
arrangement is necessary considering both stood to benefit
financially from work done by the other if the missile performed
successfully.
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Hercules paid $890,462.00 as a prerequisite to appealing the
decision to the Third Judicial District Court. See Utah Code
Ann. § 59-1-505 (1987). Of that amount, $456,512.00 was paid
under protest. On February 1, 1991, the district court reversed
the Tax Commission's Final Decision and held that Hercules was
entitled to a refund with interest on the taxes paid under
protest. The Tax Commission appealed the case to the Utah
Supreme Court, which transferred the case to us.
ISSUE
This appeal involves the application of Utah Code Ann. § 5913-93 (1967) to Hercules' sale of missile motors to Lockheed.
The Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act (UDITPA),
governs the amount of taxes payable to Utah when income is
derived from both within and without the state. Utah Code Ann.
§ 59-13-79 (1967) . The business income to be apportioned to this
state is determined by "multiplying the income by a fraction, the
numerator of which is the property factor plus the payroll factor
plus the sales factor, and the denominator of which is three."
Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-86 (1967). The sales factor is a
fraction, "the numerator of which is the total sales of the
taxpayer in this state during the tax period, and the denominator
of which is the total sales of the taxpayer everywhere during the
tax period." Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-92 (1967). Sales of
tangible personal property are "in this state" if the property is
"delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this state regardless
of the f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." Utah Code
Ann. § 59-13-93 (1967). The issue in this case is what tangible
personal property was sold by Hercules to Lockheed.
ANALYSIS
The trial court made several findings of fact concerning the
subject matter of the sale. The trial court found that the
"property" to be sold by Hercules to Lockheed under the
subcontract was "a functional rocket motor, which could be fired
when the manufacturing process was completed." The trial court
found that upon the completion of manufacturing in Utah, the
subcontract items "were not a *rocket motor' or functional unit
that could be fired," and at that point "the total manufacturing
process of the motors being purchased was approximately 60%
complete." The trial court further found "the manufacturing
process was completed at the destination assembly facility."
We review a trial court's findings of fact under a clearly
erroneous standard, giving great deference to the trial court's
findings. Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470
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(Utah 1989); Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). To successfully attack a
trial court's findings of factf an appellant must "demonstrate
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings." Grayson,
782 P.2d at 470.
We find the evidence insufficient to support the trial
court's findings. The record clearly demonstrates that the
subject of the Hercules-Lockheed subcontract was a missile motor
with accompanying services. The motor is not functional when it
leaves Hercules' Bacchus facility. It is only functional when it
is assembled into a missile. The court erred when it found the
subject matter of the Hercules sale to Lockheed was a functional
or usable motor that could be fired. In essence, the court found
the subject matter of the sale to be a completed missile. This
simply is not the case. Lockheed, as the prime contractor, sold
completed missiles to the government. Hercules, as a
subcontractor, sold a motor that was a component of the missile's
propulsion subsystem.
The trial court found that the motor was not functional when
it left Hercules' Bacchus facility, that the manufacturing
process was only 60% complete, and that the manufacturing process
would not be fully complete until further work was performed at
the destination facility. It is clear from the record that the
trial court has confused the missile motor with the missile
propulsion subsystem.4 The motor was 100% complete in Utah and
comprised approximately 60% of the propulsion subsystem. The
director of contract policy implementation for Hercules testified
at the formal hearing before the Tax Commission that "[w]hen we
finish a motor, we complete it to a drawing. It's not a usable
motor at that point, but we complete all the operations that
Bacchus is responsible for. Then Lockheed will sign off and say,
*We accept this motor.'" No motor is functional without some way
to "turn it on." Hercules sold Lockheed a completed missile
motor. Lockheed combined it with other components necessary to
"turn it on." The manufacturing of the missile motor was
completed at Hercules' Bacchus facility. The manufacturing of
the propulsion subsystem and ultimately the entire missile was
completed at the destination facility. The tangible personal
property contracted for by Hercules and Lockheed, and the subject
matter of the sale generating the business income to be
4. We reemphasize the difference between the missile motor and
the missile propulsion subsystem. The propulsion subsystem
consists of the first, second, and third stage motors, firing
units, and various other components. Without these additional
components, the motor is just as unusable as a car motor before
adding the starter, ignition switch, and other components.
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apportioned, was the missile motor as it left Hercules' Bacchus
facility-5 The trial court's findings with respect to the
property are clearly erroneous.
Section 59-13-93 of UDITPA states that sales of tangible
personal property are in this state if "the property is delivered
or shipped to a purchaser within this state regardless of the
f.o.b. point or other conditions of the sale." Utah Code Ann. §
59-13-93 (1967). Giving no regard to the f.o.b. point or other
conditions of the sale, the sale in this case is a Utah sale if
"the property is delivered or shipped to a purchaser within this
state."
The trial court applied this statutory language to erroneous
facts incorrectly concluding the sale at issue in this case was
not a Utah sale. Applying section 59-13-93 to the motor as it
left Hercules' Bacchus facility leads to only one reasonable
conclusion: the sale of the missile motor was a Utah sale.
Lockheed received the completed missile motors in Utah and is a
Utah purchaser.6 Under § 59-13-93, Hercules' sale of missile
5. Hercules bases most of its arguments on the fact that its
contractual obligations continued after the motor left the
Bacchus facility. The subcontract between Hercules and Lockheed
was for the sale of property and services. Hercules' post-sale
contractual obligations were mainly for services and are listed
in the subcontract under the heading "Technical Support
Services." The only issue before us is the apportionment of
business income generated by the sale of property. The issue of
income generated by the sale of services is not properly before
us and we do not decide that issue.
6. Hercules cites several cases for the proposition that for
purposes of determining in which state a sale takes place, the
destination or consumption rule should be applied. See Dep't of
Revenue v. Parker Banana Co.. 391 So.2d 762, 764 (Fla. Ct. App.
1980) (a purchaser from outside the state does not become a
purchaser within the state merely by sending a representative to
pick up the goods); Olympia Brewing Co. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 326
N.W.2d 642, 647 (Minn. 1982) (delivery terminates where initial
purchaser is located); Strickland v. Patcraft Mills, Inc.. 302
S.E.2d 544, 545 (Ga. 1983) (court applied destination test to
determine where sale to out-of-state customer took place). Each
of these cases, however, deals with an out-of-state purchaser
coming in state to pick up the subject matter of the sale. In
the case before us, it is undisputed that Lockheed is a
corporation present and doing business within the state of Utah.
Lockheed is a Utah purchaser. Accordingly, we do not reach
(continued...)
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motors to Lockheed is a sale within this state. The trial
court's conclusion to the contrary is incorrect.
CONCLUSION
The Auditing Division of the Tax Commission properly
assessed additional Utah Corporate Franchise taxes on Hercules
for the years 1977 through 1980. During that period, Hercules
sold missile motors to Lockheed. The motors contracted for were
the motors as they left Hercules' Bacchus, Utah facility. The
buyer, Lockheed, was doing business in Utah and was a Utah
purchaser. The sale was hence a Utah sale under Utah Code Ann. §
59-13-93 (1967), and properly included in the sales factor used
to apportion business income under Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-92
(1967). The Tax Commission's apportionment of Hercules' business
income generated from the sale of the missile motor was proper
under Utah Code Ann. § 59-13-86 (1967).
Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's decision to the
contrary.

Norman H. Jackson, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Leonard H. Russon, Judge

6. (...continued)
appellee's Commerce Clause argument because no interstate sale
occurred.
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- APPENDIX 2

-

LOCATION OF
INITIAL
PURCHASER

MANUFACTURED
OR PURCHASED
FOR RETAIL
SALE?

PRODUCT
ACCEPTED,
TITLE
TRANSFERRED,
POSSESSION
TRANSFERRED,
IN ORIGIN
STATE?

INTENDED FOR
USE AT
DESTINATION
STATE?

DESTINATION
APPARENT AT
TIME OF
INITIAL
PURCHASE?

HERCULES V. UTAH
STATE TAX COMMISSION

IN-STATE

YES

YES

YES

YES

BULLOCK

IN-STATE

OLYMPIA

OUT-OF-STATE

STRICKLAND

OUT-OF-STATE

PABST

OUT-OF-STATE

TEXACO

OUT-OF-STATE

PARKER BANANA

OUT-OF-STATE

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES

NO
YES
YES
YES
NO
YES

I HOWMET

OUT-OF-STATE

YES

J

